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ARTICLES
SETTLING OBJECTIONS TO DISCHARGE IN
BANKRUPTCY CASES: AN UNSETTLING LOOK
AT VERY UNSETTLED LAW
Terrence L. Michael* and Michael R. Pacewicz**

I.

INTRODUCTION 1

Much has been said and written about the increase in the number of
bankruptcy filings in the past decade. Since 1996, over one million
bankruptcy cases have been filed each year-the vast majority of which
are individual (non-business) cases.2
Of those non-business cases,
approximately seventy percent were Chapter 7, or straight liquidation
cases. 3 One of the principal motivations for an individual filing a Chapter
7 bankruptcy case is to obtain a discharge.
The path to a discharge is not always smooth. Creditors and the
trustee in the bankruptcy case have the right to review the debtor's
conduct and contest the debtor's right to a discharge. These actions are
brought as adversary proceedings, in essence separate lawsuits under the
umbrella of the bankruptcy case, under § 523 or § 727 of the Bankruptcy
Code.4 Under § 523, a party may seek to have one or more particular
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3. See i&L; JudicialBusiness of the U.S. Courts 2000 29 (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts

2001).
4. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the United States Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. (West 2001).
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debts declared non-dischargeable. This type of action deals only with the
debts owed to the creditor filing the action, and has no effect upon the
discharge of debts that are not the subject of the action. On the other
hand, an action brought under § 727, if successful, results in a complete
denial of the debtor's discharge.
In that case, the debtor remains
personally liable for all debts existing when the case was filed.
Litigation relating to the bankruptcy discharge shares several traits
with other types of litigation. It is the subject of discovery, pre-trial
practice, and trial.
It is also often the subject of negotiation and
settlement. The issues of whether, how, when, and on what terms these
actions may be settled have been the topic of much litigation. As one
might expect, court decisions vary both in result and reasoning. This
Article will briefly explore the nature of the bankruptcy discharge, the
various bases for objection both to the dischargeability of a particular debt
and the denial of the discharge as a whole, and then take a detailed look at
the differing positions taken by the courts with respect to settlement of
such actions.
II.

THE BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE

The concept of bankruptcy as a mechanism for the protection of
debtors is a relatively recent phenomenon, originating in this country with
the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.5 The English bankruptcy laws
that foreshadowed the American bankruptcy system were intended
primarily to assist creditors in recovering payment from delinquent
debtors. 6 Prior to 1898, early United States bankruptcy legislation strongly
favored creditors. For example, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, the
approval of the bankruptcy commissioners and the creditors was a
prerequisite to the granting of a discharge.7 Furthermore, creditors were
not automatically enjoined from attempting to collect on debts that had
been discharged. Instead, the debtor had to raise the discharge as an
affirmative defense in the event a creditor initiated collection proceedings.8
In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,9 the United States Supreme Court coined
the oft-cited phrase that bankruptcy laws exist to provide "the honest but

5. As Professor Tabb noted:
[The 1898 law recognized formally for the first time the overriding public interest
in granting a discharge to 'honest but unfortunate' debtors. The theory is that
society as a whole benefits when an overburdened debtor is freed from the
oppressive weight of accumulated debt. That debtor then is able to resume his or
her place as a productive member of society. Furthermore, societal forgiveness of
the debts of the honest unfortunate is considered to be humane.
Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 Amer.
Bankr. L.J. 325, 364-65 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
6. See icl. at 326-37.
7. See id. at 346.
8. See icL at 347.
9. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
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unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he
owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field
for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
pre-existing debt."1 ° The legal tool used to "clear the field" for the
bankruptcy debtor is the order of discharge. This discharge, as outlined in
§ 524(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, operates as an injunction against all
efforts to recover debts owed prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case as a
personal liability of the debtor."
Commentators have noted that the
United States has one of the most liberal discharge provisions in the world
today. 12
The benefit of a discharge is not without its burdens. Debtors are
required to file a list of all assets and liabilities, under penalty of perjury.13
Debtors are required to appear at a meeting of creditors and testify under
oath as to their financial affairs."' Debtors are expected to cooperate with
the Chapter 7 trustee and, when appropriate, surrender all non-exempt
property to the trustee so that it may be liquidated and the proceeds paid
to creditors. Failure to perform these duties creates the prospect that the
debtor's discharge may be denied.
III.

GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF DISCHARGE

The grounds for denial of a discharge are contained in § 727(a).'9

10. Id. at 244 (citations omitted).
11. 11. U.S.C. § 524(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states that(a) A discharge in a case under this title(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such
judgment is a determination of the personal liabifity of the debtor with
respect to any debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328
of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived;
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of
an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset
any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge
of such debt is waived; and
(3) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of
an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect or recover from, or
offset against, property of the debtor of the kind specified in section 541(a)(2)
of this title that is acquired after the commencement of the case, on account
of any allowable community claim, except a community claim that is
excepted from discharge under section 523, 1228(a)(1), or 1328(a)(1) of this
title, or that would be so excepted, determined in accordance with the
provisions of sections 523(c) and 523(d) of this title, in a case concerning the
debtor's spouse commenced on the date of the filing of the petition in the
case concerning the debtor, whether or not discharge of the debt based on
such community claim is waived.
11 U.S.CA § 524(a) (West 2001).
12. See e.g. Rafael Erfat, The Fresh-StartPolicy in Bankruptcy in Modem Day Israel 7
Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 555 (1999); Tabb, supra n. 5; John C. McCoid, Discharge: The
Most ImportantDevelopment in Bankruptcy History, 70 Amer. Bankr. L.J. 163 (1996).
13. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(b) (West 2001).
14. See 11 U.S.CA. § 343 (West 2001).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) reads as follows:
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Several of these grounds relate to the conduct of the debtor during the
bankruptcy case; i.e., has the debtor behaved as one would expect an
§ 727. Discharge
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless(1) the debtor is not an individual;
(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer
of the estate charged with custody of property under this title, has
transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted to
be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of
the petition; or
(B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing of the petition;
(3) the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep
or preserve any recorded information, including books, documents, records,
and papers, from which the debtor's financial condition or business
transactions might be ascertained, unless such act or failure to act was
justified under all of the circumstances of the case;
(4) the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case*
(A) made a false oath or account;
(B) presented or used a false claim;
(C) gave, offered, received, or attempted to obtain money, property, or
advantage, or a promise of money, property, or advantage, for acting or
forbearing to act; or
(D) withheld from an officer of the estate entitled to possession under
this title, any recorded information, including books, documents,
records, and papers, relating to the debtor's property or financial affairs;
(5) the debtor has failed to explain satisfactorily, before determination of
denial of discharge under this paragraph, any loss of assets or deficiency of
assets to meet the debtor's liabilities;
(6) the debtor has refused, in the case(A) to obey any lawful order of the court, other than an order to respond
to a material question or to testify;
(B) on the ground of privilege against self-incrimination, to respond to a
material question approved by the court or to testify, after the debtor
has been granted immunity with respect to the matter concerning which
such privilege was invoked; or
(C) on a ground other than the properly invoked privilege against selfincrimination, to respond to a material question approved by the court
or to testify;
(7) the debtor has committed any act specified in paragraph (2), (3), (4), (5), or
(6) of this subsection, on or within one year before the date of the filing of the
petition, or during the case, in connection with another case, under this title
or under the Bankruptcy Act, concerning an insider;
(8) the debtor has been granted a discharge under this section, under section
1141 of this title, or under section 14, 371, or 476 of the Bankruptcy Act, in
a case commenced within six years before the date of the filing of the
petition;
(9) the debtor has been granted a discharge under section 1228 or 1328 of
this title, or under section 660 or 661 of the Bankruptcy Act, in a case
commenced within six years before the date of the filing of the petition,
unless payments under the plan in such case totaled at least(A) 100 percent of the allowed unsecured claims in such case; or
(B)(i) 70 percent of such claims; and
(ii) the plan was proposed by the debtor in good faith, and was the
debtor's best effort; or
(10) the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor
after the order for relief under this chapter.
11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a) (West 2001).
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"honest but unfortunate debtor" to behave? Discharges are denied where a
debtor has acted fraudulently in submitting financial information to the
trustee or the court, 16 concealed assets with the goal of keeping them free
of the claims of creditors,' 7 or failed to cooperate with the trustee in the
administration of the case.' 8 Performance of each of these duties is
essential to the integrity and proper functioning of the bankruptcy system.
In the case of In re Moore,'9 Judge Clive Bare stated it thusly:
Discharge, the principal objective of a chapter 7 debtor, is a statutory right
involving public policy considerations. It is not a proper subject for
contractual negotiation. Discharge is refused to a dishonest bankrupt as
a punishment for his fraud and to prevent its continuance in the future.
In a sense the question has passed beyond the creditors and is one of
public policy .... 20
Under this analysis, which has been phrased in other ways by other
21
courts, creditors who decide to file objections to discharge assume duties
to the other creditors, and to the bankruptcy system as a whole.
IV. COMPLAINTS TO DETERMiNE THE DISCHARGEABILTrY OF PARTIcuLAR DEBTS
Actions to determine the dischargeability of a particular debt, under §
523, concern conduct between the debtor and a particular creditor, rather
than the conduct of the debtor during the administration of the
bankruptcy case.2 2 If a creditor prevails on its complaint to determine
16. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(4)(A) (West 2001).
17. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(2) (West 2001).
18. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(4)(D) (West 2001).
19. 50 B.R. 661, 664 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985).
20. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
21. See e.g. In re Huller, 179 B.R. 253, 261 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1994) ("§ 727 is the
gatekeeper for allowing only honest debtors the extraordinary relief afforded by the
Bankruptcy Code. It is a guardian of the bankruptcy system; it proscribes dishonest,
deceptive, and disingenuous debtor conduct that is part of or related to the bankruptcy
system; it upholds the integrity and stature of the bankruptcy process.").
22. The relevant portions of II U.S.C. § 523 provides that(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt(1) for a tax or a customs duty(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(2) or
507(a)(8) of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or
allowed;
(B) with respect to which a return, if required(i) was not filed; or
(ii) was filed after the date on which such return was last due,
under applicable law or under any extension, and after two years
before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(C) with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully
attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax;
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of
credit, to the extent obtained by(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a
statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
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dischargeability, only the particular debt at issue is not discharged. The
debtor receives a discharge of all other debts. As such, dischargeability
complaints are treated as private causes of action. Although some courts
have indicated that court approval of settlements of § 523 complaints is
required,2 there is very little authority on the issue. It appears that most
courts allow parties to settle dischargeability complaints on their own
terms so long as the complaints do not also contain allegations that the
debtor's discharge should (or in the alternative) be denied in its entirety
under § 727.24

(B) use of a statement in writing(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for such
money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to
deceive; or
(C) for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, consumer debts
owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than $1,000 for "luxury
goods or services" incurred by an individual debtor on or within 60 days
before the order for relief under this title, or cash advances aggregating
more than $1,000 that are extensions of consumer credit under an open
end credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within 60 days
before the order for relief under this title, are presumed to be
nondischargeable; "luxury goods or services" do not include goods or
services reasonably acquired for the support or maintenance of the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor; an extension of consumer credit
under an open end credit plan is to be defined for purposes of this
subparagraph as it is defined in the Consumer Credit Protection Act;
(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement,
or larceny;
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the
property of another entity;
(15) not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred by the debtor
in the course of a divorce or separation or in connection with a separation
agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, a determination
made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit
unless(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from income or
property of the debtor not reasonably necessary to be expended for the
maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor and,
if the debtor is engaged in a business, for the payment of expenditures
necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of such
business; or
(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that
outweighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse, former spouse, or
child of the debtor;
11 U.S.C.A. § 523 (West 2001).
23. See e.g. Loc. R. 7090-1 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.) (requiring court approval of a compromise
of an action brought under § 523); Loc. R 4007-2(a) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y) (same).
24. See e.g. Loc. R. 9019(a)(3) (Bankr. W.D. Tex) ("No application to compromise an
adversary proceeding need be fied in order to settle a nondischargeability action fied
pursuant to Section 523.").
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V.

THE CONCEPT OF COMPROMISE

In many ways, bankruptcy courts are courts of economics.

The

primary relationship in every bankruptcy case is the relationship between
debtor and creditor. The debtor seeks an economic fresh start through
discharge of pre-petition debt, while the creditor hopes to maximize its
recovery with a minimum of additional expense.
In many cases,
compromise is the best way to achieve both goals. Compromise
is
the
linchpin of bankruptcy practice.
Without it, the business of the
bankruptcy courts would slow considerably, if not come to a screeching
halt. An overwhelming number of disputes in bankruptcy cases are settled
short of trial on the merits. When compromises are reached, the rules of
bankruptcy subject the agreement to court review and approval.25 It is well
established that, "[t]he decision of whether to approve a proposed
settlement is within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court."26 One
court has stated:
In exercising this discretion, the court must consider and weigh the
following criteria:
(1) The probability of success on the merits in the litigation;
(2) The difficulties, if any, to be encountered in collection of any judgment
that might be obtained;
(3) The complexity of the litigation involved,
inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it;

and

the

expense,

(4) The paramount interests of creditors and the proper deference to their
reasonable views in the premises; and
(5) Whether the conclusion of the litigation promotes the integrity of the

25. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 provides:

(a) Compromise
On motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a
compromise or settlement. Notice shall be given to creditors, the United States
Trustee, the debtor, and indenture trustees as provided in Rule 2002 and to any
other entity as the court may direct.
(b) Authority to compromise or settle controversies within classes
After a hearing on such notice as the court may direct, the court may fix a class
or classes of controversies and authorize the trustee to compromise or settle
controversies within such class or classes without further hearing or notice.
(c) Arbitration
On stipulation of the parties to any controversy affecting the estate the court may
authorize the matter to be submitted to final and binding arbitration.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 (West 2001).
26. In re Bates, 211 B.R. 338, 343 (Bankr. D. Minn., 1997) (citations omitted); see
generally In re Taylor, 190 B.R. 413, 417 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995) (implicit in Rule 7041 is
the exercise ofjudicial discretion) (citations omitted).
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27

judicial system.

A bankruptcy court is not bound to substitute its judgment for the
judgment of the parties, but rather should consider whether the settlement
falls within the range of reasonable compromises for such litigation.2
VI.

SETTLEMENT OF §

727 COMPLAINTS

Special attention is paid under the bankruptcy rules to compromises
of objections to discharge. As noted above, objections to discharge are
presented to the bankruptcy court in the form of adversary proceedings,
29
Unlike
which constitute separate lawsuits within the bankruptcy case.
complaints to determine the dischargeability of a particular debt,
settlement of § 727 claims is a matter in which most, if not all, courts take
some degree of interest. Some of that interest is mandated by Bankruptcy
Rule 7041, which provides that
a complaint objecting to the debtor's discharge shall not be dismissed at
the plaintiffs instance without notice to the trustee, the United States
Trustee, and such other persons as the court may direct, and only on
order of the court containing terms and conditions which the court deems
30
proper.
Not surprisingly, bankruptcy courts have often been asked to approve
settlements between debtors and creditors or debtors and the bankruptcy
trustee which call for dismissal of an objection to discharge. What is
surprising is the range of answers given by the bankruptcy courts.
A.

Settlement Disapproved as Always Contraryto Public Policy

Cases which prohibit the settlement of objections to discharge predate the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. In the case of In re Levy,3 ' a
case decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, it was alleged that the
debtor converted assets from his business immediately prior to filing his
bankruptcy case. An action was brought to compel the debtor to turn
these monies over to the bankruptcy estate. 32 The debtor proposed to
settle the turnover action by making a cash payment of $5,000 to the
trustee and "on condition that there be no opposition to the discharge."3
The district court approved the compromise and allowed the debtor his
discharge. 34 One of the creditors appealed the decision. In reversing the
decision of the district court, the court of appeals held that

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Bates, 211 B.R. at 343 (citations omitted).
See id.
See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001 et seq. (West 2001).
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7041 (West 2001).
127 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1942).
See id.at 63.

Id.
Id.
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Any offer of that character is wholly illegal.
The reason is plain.
Discharge is not personal to the creditors. It is general to the public and
particularly that part of it which constitutes the world of commerce.
Persons with undesirable business ethics are not to be turned loose to
prey on their fellow merchants. This general protection cannot be waived
by particular creditors whose private greed outruns their community
35
spirit.
The court of appeals not only disapproved the compromise; it found that
grounds existed to revoke the debtor's discharge.3 6 More recently, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that the
granting of a discharge "is not the proper subject for negotiation and the
37
exchange of a quid pro quo."
In the case In re Moore,38 both the Chapter 7 trustee and a creditor
brought separate objections to discharge.
The parties negotiated a
settlement whereby all objections to discharge, as well as three adversary
proceedings filed to avoid pre-petition transfers by the debtor, would be
dismissed with prejudice in exchange for a $1.3 million3 9 payment by the
debtor to the bankruptcy estate. Notice of the proposed compromise and
40
dismissal of litigation was given to all creditors and parties in interest.
There were no objections. 4 1 Nonetheless, the court refused to approve the
compromise, noting that
During his testimony supporting the compromise, which represents a
bargained for exchange, the trustee spoke of the debtor 'buying his
discharge.'
Because it involves questions of public policy previously
determined by the Congress, a discharge in bankruptcy is not an
appropriate element of a quid pro quo. Tying withdrawal of objections to
discharge to the settlement of other actions is contrary to public policy.
Under no circumstances, not even where the intent is innocent, may a
debtor purchase a repose from objections to discharge. A discharge in
bankruptcy
depends on the debtor's conduct; it is not an object of
42
bargain.
Similarly, in the case of In re Vickers,4 3 the bankruptcy trustee sought
approval of a compromise where the debtor would pay $24,000 to the
bankruptcy estate in exchange for dismissal with prejudice of a complaint
objecting to discharge. In support of the compromise, the trustee argued
that there was no money in the estate to fund the discharge litigation and

35. Id&at 63.
36. Id.
37. State Bank of India v. Chalasani(In re Chalasan),92 F.3d 1300, 1310 (2d Cir. 1996)
(citation omitted).
38. 50 B.R. 661 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985).
39. Id. at 662.
40. Id. at 661.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 664 (emphasis in original).
43. 176 B.R. 287 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994).
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that the risk of nonpayment of attorney's fees incurred by the trustee was
too great to justify continued litigation. 44 The bankruptcy court, showing
an obvious distaste for the trustee's position, held as follows:
Either the discharges ought to be granted or they ought to be denied.
Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee to seek funds from a
debtor or to release a non-debtor entity as a price for giving up on a
discharge complaint. Discharges are not property of the estate and are
not for sale. It is against public policy to sell discharges. The reasons are
obvious. Selling discharges would be a disease that would attack the
heart of the bankruptcy process, its integrity. A trustee seeking to get
paid may coerce an honest debtor into paying something to get rid of a
complaint that has no merit. A dishonest debtor may cover up even
greater sins than those that gave rise to the complaint in the first place.
The conduct described in these hypothetical situations may be criminal
bankruptcy fraud. By contrast, what appears to be happening here is that
the trustee is seeking to settle two different types of claims that may be
related by facts but not by the type of relief available to the estate. Public
policy forbids him to offer to settle one in order to settle the other.45
In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Colorado reached the same result, noting "it is simply improper for a
debtor and creditor to horsetrade over a discharge."4 6
B.

Settlement Prohibitedby Local Rule

Some bankruptcy courts have implemented local rules that make it
impossible to dismiss an objection to discharge in exchange for any sort of
consideration.4 7 In Minnesota, a claim objecting to discharge may not be
dismissed unless the plaintiff "shall file an affidavit stating that nothing
has been received by or promised to the plaintiff in consideration of the
request for dismissal. " 4s Similar rules are found in the Eastern District of
5s
Michigan,

49

50

the Middle District of Louisiana,

the District of Connecticut,

44. Id. at 289.
45. Id. at 290 (citations omitted).
46. Pennwell Printing Co. v. Stout (In re Stout), 262 B.R. 862, 864 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2001)
(citation omitted).
47. A number of other courts have adopted a slightly different approach, formulating
local rules that require the disclosure of any consideration provided to the plaintiff in
exchange for dismissing or withdrawing a complaint objecting to the debtor's discharge.
See e.g. Loc. R. 7041-1 (Bankr. E.D. Va.); Loc. R. 9019(b)(2) (Bankr. W.D. Tex.); Loc. R.
7090-1 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.); Loc. R. 4004-2 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.); Loc. R. 7001-1(B) (Bankr. D.
Neb.); Loc. R 7041-1(B) (Bankr. E.D. La.); Loc. R 19(e)(2) (Bankr. S.D. Iowa.); Loc. R
4004-2(a) (Bankr. N.D. Iowa); Loc. R. B-4004-2(b) (Bankr. S.D. Ind.); Loc. R 7041-2(b)
(Bankr. N.D. Ind.); Loc. R. 502 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.); Loc. R. 7041-1(a) (Bankr. D.D.C.); Loc. R.
7041-1(a) (Bankr. D. Alaska); Loc. R. 4007(a) (Bankr. D. Vt.).
48. Loc. R. 7041-1 (Bankr. D. Minn.).
49. Loc. R 7041-1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.).
50. Loc. R 7041-1 (Bankr. M.D. La.).
51. Loc. R. 7041-1(b) (Bankr. D. Conn.).
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the Southern District of New York, 52 and the Southern District of
Califomia.
This approach has been viewed favorably by the drafters of
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The Committee Notes to
Bankruptcy Rule 7041 state:
Dismissal of a complaint objecting to a discharge raises special concerns
because the plaintiff may have been induced to dismiss by an advantage
given or promised by the debtor or someone acting in his interest. Some
courts by local rule or order have required the debtor and his attorney or
the plaintiff to file an affidavit that nothing has been promised to the
plaintiff in consideration of the withdrawal of the objection. By specifically
authorizing the court to impose conditions in the order of dismissal this
rule permits continuation of this salutary practice.5
The effect of this "salutary practice" is that objections to discharge may
never be settled in the face of such rules.
At least one court has relied on its local rule in refusing to approve a
compromise of a § 727 claim. In Migoscha, S.A. v. Meffert (In re Meffert),55
the debtor agreed to make cash payments to an objecting creditor in
exchange for withdrawal of the § 727 complaint. The bankruptcy court
denied the debtor's motion to approve the settlement solely on the ground
that the settlement violated the court's local rule, which prohibits the
granting of a discharge where a § 727 complaint is withdrawn, unless the
debtor fies an affidavit and the debtor's attorney files a certification that no
consideration was provided in exchange.5 6 Interestingly, the court noted
that the settlement may have been appropriate had the
complaint included
57
a § 523 claim and had the § 727 claim lacked merit.
The policy embodied in these decisions and rules-namely the
prohibition against the sale or purchase of discharges-is laudable.
However, an argument can be made that this approach relies upon two
suspect assumptions. The first assumption is that every objection to
discharge has merit. In effect, these courts are taking the position that
once an objection to discharge is filed, it is valid on its face until it is
defeated at trial. Such a "guilty until proven innocent" view is rarely
espoused in the world of civil litigation. It is also contrary to the
proposition that "[iun order to fulfill the primary purpose of the Bankruptcy
Code of providing debtors with a 'fresh start,' objections to discharge
under Section 727 are construed strictly against the plaintiff and liberally
58
in favor of the debtor."

52. Loc. R. 4007-2(a) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).
53. Loc. R. 7041-4(b) (Bankr. S.D. Cal.).
54. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7041 (West 2001) (quoting the advisory committee notes).
55. 232 B.R. 71, 73 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998).
56. Id at 73-74.
57. Id at 74 n. 3.
58. In re Constantin, 201 B.R. 312, 315 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (citations and emphasis
omitted); see generally In re Black, 787 F.2d 503, 505 (10th Cir. 1986).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001

11

648

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 3, Art. 1
TULSA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 37:637

In addition, these decisions assume that objections to discharge are
filed in every case where grounds for them exist. Although it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to gather empirical evidence on this point, it
seems likely that situations exist where it makes no economic sense for a
creditor to pursue an objection to discharge even where valid grounds are
present. It is not uncommon for a practicing bankruptcy attorney to
advise creditors that the net effect of a successful objection to discharge
would be to allow that creditor, together with all other creditors in the case,
to continue to pursue collection against a debtor who in all likelihood is
judgment proof. On many occasions, the creditor will decline to throw
good money after bad. Similarly, it is equally likely that many Chapter 7
trustees decline to fie objections to discharge when faced with the prospect
of going unpaid. Thus, if the goal of these courts is to ensure that only the
"honest but unfortunate debtor" obtains a discharge in each and every
case, prohibiting the settlement of all § 727 litigation does not necessarily
further that goal.
C.

Settlement Allowed after Notice and an Opportunity to Intervene

A minority of courts have held that a complaint objecting to discharge
may always be settled after proper notice and an opportunity to assume
prosecution of the complaint is given to all other creditors and parties in
interest, when there are no objections to the settlement and none of the
other parties wish to assume prosecution of the objection to discharge.
These courts have looked at the discharge litigation as more of a civil
matter. They note the importance of settlements in the administration of
bankruptcy cases and the practical difficulty of forcing the prosecution of
an action by an unwilling plaintiff.
In the case of In re Margolin,59 a bank fied an action seeking to deny
the debtor's discharge under § 727, or in the alternative, hold the debt
owed to the bank non-dischargeable under § 523. The factual basis for
both causes of action was that the debtor had provided the bank with a
financial statement showing a significant net worth, all of which had
seemingly dissipated without explanation in the five-year period between
the time the debtor gave the bank the financial statement and the time the
debtor filed for bankruptcy protection. 60 The bank reasoned that either the
debtor had failed to explain the loss of assets or had provided the bank
with a false financial statement at the time he obtained the loan, which are
both grounds for holding a debt non-dischargeable under § 523. During
discovery, the bank determined that the debtor had never held the assets
that he had listed on the financial statement, a conclusion that "vitiated all

59. 135 B.R. 671 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).
60. Id. at 672.
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of the [bank's] § 727 allegations."6 The debtor and the bank then entered
into a settlement in which the bank agreed to dismiss its § 727 cause of
action in exchange for a judgment of non-dischargeability in the amount of
$97,501.36, which the debtor could satisfy in full through the payment of
$25,000 to the bank.6 2 Notice of the proposed settlement was given to all
creditors and parties in interest, including the trustee. 63 Only the trustee
objected to the settlement, on the grounds that by filing the complaint, the
bank had assumed a fiduciary duty to all creditors and was thus
precluded from settling the § 727 action for its own personal gain. 64
The court overruled the trustee's objection and approved the
settlement. In doing so, the court expressly rejected the ruling in Moore.
This court, as did Judge Boe in the case of In re Nicolosi, has extreme
difficulty with that holding. The solution found by other courts to this
tension between vindication of the public interest in upholding the policies
behind § 727, and the public interest in fostering the peaceful, just,
speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes, is to (1) provide notice and
full disclosure of the terms of such agreements between the original
complaining creditor and debtor to all parties in interest; and (2) to allow
other creditors and/or the trustee to intervene or be substituted for the
original complaining creditor in order to prosecute the § 727 complaint.
This court adopts that solution.65
61. Id.
62.
63.
64.
65.
relied

Id. at 672-73.
Id. at 673.
Id.
Margolin, 135 B.R at 673 (citations omitted). The footnote from the Nicolosi case
upon by Judge Brumbaugh is equally enlightening:

With these safeguards available, I have extreme difficulty with the holdings in
Moore and Levy, supra, that a section 727(a) objection to discharge cannot be
compromised. The purposes of the justice system are the peaceful, just, speedy
and inexpensive resolution of disputes. The law normally favors compromise to
achieve these ends. If voluntary compromise can be effected, the justice reached
by the parties themselves may be superior to that judicially imposed.
Compromise also reduces burdens on the public treasury and lessens judicial
backlog. Reduction in backlog allows cases to be brought to trial before the
memories of witnesses dim and documents are lost, thus brightening the prospect
that, in other cases awaiting trial, justice will truly be done. Compromise also
reduces the costs and burdens that society imposes on 'innocent bystanders',
nonlitigants whose documents or testimony is subpoenaed.
The practical effect of determining that a section 727(a) objection to discharge can
never be compromised could severely chill the rights of plaintiffs to allege section
727(a) causes of action. Once the adversary complaint alleged such a cause of
action, there presumably could be no compromise of the complaint even when
other, meritorious causes of action were alleged in the same complaint, e.g.,
exceptions to discharge under section 523(a). Even if a plaintiff bifurcated his
causes and dismissed the section 727 cause under Rule 7041 and then settled
the section 523 action, a court could not determine whether an advantage was
given for the dismissal of the section 727 objection to discharge. Unless the
plaintiff simply dismissed, litigants would be forced to go to trial whenever section
727(a) and section 523(a) causes of action were alleged by the same plaintiff. This
Court has well over one hundred such hybrid adversary complaints currently
pending. There is a simple explanation for this. Even though section 727(a) and
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The court went on to note that no creditors opposed the settlement, and
none sought permission to continue the § 727 action. 66 In addition, in the
two months since she had been notified of the proposed settlement, the
trustee had not sought to assume prosecution of the § 727 complaint.
Instead, she sought an order compelling the bank to continue the
prosecution. 67 The court declined to enter such an order, and approved
the settlement.6
Two cases from Louisiana in the mid-1980s reached the same result.
In the case of In re ShortL69 both a creditor and the Chapter 7 trustee filed
objections to discharge based upon the debtor's alleged failure to disclose
certain assets and preferential transfers in his schedules. Both of these
adversaries were tried, and the court entered orders in each denying the
debtor's discharge.70 Each of these decisions was appealed. While on
appeal, the debtor reached settlements with both the creditor and the
71
trustee.
Under the terms of the settlements, the debtor paid an
undisclosed sum to the creditor, and $12,709.95 to the trustee, in
exchange for dismissal of the objections to discharge.7 2 The court, after
noting that "in both of these proceedings the plaintiffs are receiving an
73
advantage in exchange for which they will dismiss the complaint,"
approved the settlements subject to notice and an opportunity to object to
all creditors.74

section 523(a) causes of action are distinct, and with differing burdens of proof,
they can have many factual elements in common. Compare section 727(a)(4) with
section 523(a)(2) and (a)(4) and section 727(a)(2) and (a)(3) with section 523(a)(6).
Without the opportunity to compromise, a litigant is left with 'no way out' except
to give up or to pursue the martial arts of litigation to their ultimate conclusion.
In reNicolosi, 86 B.R. 882, 889 n. 4 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1988).
66. Margolin, 135 B.R. at 673.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 673-74.
69. 60 B.R. 951 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1986).
70. One of the decisions was published. See id. Neither the opinion on the objection to
discharge nor the opinion dealing with the settlement discloses why two separate
complaints objecting to discharge were actually tried. In most cases, the court will only try
one objection to discharge for the simple reason that once a discharge is denied, all further
litigation relating to discharge or dischargeability is rendered moot.
71. Short, 60 B.R. at 952.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 953.
74. The following passage from Short is most insightful:
Since Rule 7041 requires that the trustee receive notice of the dismissal of a
complaint to deny the debtor's discharge and since the rule also allows the Court
to set terms and conditions that it deems proper, the Court will require a notice to
all creditors and parties in interest of the motion to dismiss. The notice will
further state that the complaint will be dismissed unless, within 20 days, a
creditor or other interested party requests to be substituted as plaintiff and/or
objects to the dismissal. It will also state the advantage that the Debtor is
providing in exchange for the plaintiffs motion to dismiss. This condition of full
disclosure will provide all interested parties with the right to object to the
dismissal and with the right to continue prosecution of the complaint to deny the
Debtor's discharge if they wish to do so. If no creditor cares to pursue and if the
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Less than a year later, the same bankruptcy judge was presented with
5
a similar situation. In the case of In re Corban,7
the creditor brought an
objection to discharge under § 727(a)(2), alleging that the debtors
"intentionally disposed of fully encumbered property to the prejudice of the
secured creditor."7 6 After the debtors filed an answer, but before the case
could be tried, the creditor sought to dismiss the adversary proceeding
"upon the grounds that the petitioner and the defendants have reached an
amicable settlement."77 The terms of the settlement were quite simple: the
debtors agreed to reaffirm the debt owed to the particular creditor in
exchange for dismissal of the complaint objecting to discharge.7 8
In considering the settlement, the court noted the distinction between
complaints brought under § 727 and § 523. However, in this case, the
court considered the complaint to be "a hybrid of these two concepts."7 9
The court then approved the settlement using the following analysis:
This proceeding involves an allegation of misconduct under § 727 that, if
true, would have direct effect only between the Debtors and the
complaining creditor since the complaint alleges that the Debtors disposed
of fully encumbered property with the intent to hinder, defraud, or delay
creditors. The only effect of the conduct, if proved to be true, is that the
Plaintiff/creditor would retain a minimal unsecured debt whereas if the
conduct alleged were not true the creditor would be fully secured. The
proceeding currently under discussion, therefore, has bases in the
objectives both of § 523 and of § 727.

Since the Debtors are represented by counsel and have agreed to
settlement, and after consideration of all facts and circumstances peculiar
to the case, I conclude that it is not inequitable for the Debtors to make
good the results of its alleged misconduct. The alleged misconduct has
minimal or no effect on other creditors, is of limited significance as public
policy, and is apparently remedied by the proposed method of settlement.
The trustee
has been noticed of the proposed settlement and has no
80
objection.
The court went on to approve the settlement, but did require an additional
certification by the attorney for the debtors regarding his negotiations of
the settlement.8 1

trustee does not wish to pursue denial of a discharge, the Court can see no
authority to deny the dismissaland no way to achieve the prosecutionof the case.
Id. (emphasis added).
75. 71 B.R. 327 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987).
76. Id. at 328.
77. Id. at 328-29.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Corban,71 B.RI at 330.
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These decisions raise several interesting issues. In Short, settlements
were reached after the court had conducted a trial on the merits and
determined that the debtor was not entitled to his discharge. On that
basis, a very strong argument can be made that the debtor was clearly
"buying his discharge," both from the objecting creditor and the trustee. In
both cases, the court had no concern as to where the consideration was
ultimately paid for the settlements; i.e., to the objecting creditor or to the
trustee. The statements in Corban that analogize the § 727 claim to a §
523 claim are quite interesting. The court seems to be saying that some
claims under § 727 have less public policy implications than others and
that where conduct which violates § 727 adversely effects only one creditor
(i.e., conversion of collateral), settlement of a § 727 claim is not tantamount
to buying a discharge.
D.

Settlement Consideredon a Case-by-CaseBasis

Not surprisingly, the majority of courts fall between the two extremes
discussed above. In general, these courts permit § 727 claims to be
settled, provided two requirements are met. First, the consideration paid
in exchange for dismissing the complaint must inure to the benefit of all
creditors in the case.
Second, all creditors must be afforded the
opportunity to assume prosecution of the § 727 claim, should they so
desire. 2
In the case of In re Bates,8 3 the debtor filed his Chapter 7 bankruptcy
and received a discharge. Thereafter, the bankruptcy trustee discovered
various unscheduled assets and potentially avoidable pre-petition
transfers.' 4 The trustee fied an action to revoke the debtor's discharge
based upon the debtor's alleged concealment.8 5 The debtor strongly denied
the trustee's accusations, contending that any insufficient disclosure was
the result of oversight or innocent mistake. 86 After negotiations, the
trustee and the debtor entered into a settlement where the debtor would
pay the estate $250,000 over a three-year period in exchange for dismissal
of all pending litigation against the debtor, including the action to revoke
his discharge. 87 The settlement would result in a distribution to unsecured

82. Not surprisingly, there is a split of authority on the issue of whether a creditor may
be substituted as a party plaintiff in a § 727 action where the time for filing such
complaints has expired. Compare Hage v. Joseph (In re Joseph), 121 B.R_ 679 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1990) (allowing such substitution) with State Bank of India v. Chalasani(In re
Chalasani), 92 F.3d 1300 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding such substitution to be expressly
prohibited under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25); Pennwell Printing Co. v. Stout (In re
Stout), 262 B.IR 862 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2001) (reaching the same result in reliance upon

Chalasani).
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

211 B.R. 338 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997).
Id. at 340.
Id
Id. at 342.
Id.
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creditors of approximately 63 percent of their total claims.8 8 Notice of the
proposed settlement was given to all creditors and parties in interest."
The only objections to the settlement were filed by the United States
Trustee and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). 90 Both of these entities
objected on the basis that the debtor was "buying his discharge" which was
contrary to public policy. 9' The IRS admitted that the settlement was in its
best economic interests.92 There is nothing in the record to indicate that
either the United States Trustee or the IRS sought permission to continue
the prosecution of the action.
After thorough consideration, the court approved the settlement.93 In
doing so, the court relied upon three basic legal principles. First, the court
ruled that when an individual creditor files an action objecting to or
seeking to revoke a debtor's discharge, that creditor "assumes a duty to act
in the best interests of the general creditor body."94 Due to the existence of
this duty, the court concluded that it would be "perse inappropriate" to
approve any settlement of a § 727 claim where the consideration was paid
to a single creditor rather than to the trustee for the benefit of all
creditors. 9 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in part upon a
local rule that required a plaintiff objecting to discharge to file an affidavit
"stating that nothing has been received by or promised to the plaintiff in
consideration of the request for dismissal."96 The court went on to note
that the local rule did not place such a restriction upon the settlement of a
§ 727 complaint filed by the Chapter 7 trustee or the United States
Trustee. 97 The court found the settlement to be proper because the monies
to be paid would be available for distribution to all creditors.98 Finally, the
court ruled that where the merits of a discharge action have yet to be
determined, settlement of the action does not constitute the "buying of the

88. Id. at 345.
89. Bates, 211 B.R. at 342.
90. Id. at 343.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 348.
94. Id. at 346 (citations omitted).
95. Bates, 211 B.R. at 346-47. Several other courts have reached the same conclusion.
See e.g. In re Smith, 207 B.R. 177, 178 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1997) (and cases cited therein)
("Some things are black and white and this is one of them. If the successfiul prosecution of
a proceeding will benefit the entire creditor body, that action may not be settled in return
for a private benefit. Unless the same parties that would benefit from the successful
prosecution of a particular action also receive the benefits of its settlement, the settlement
is improper. No amount of notice, absence of objection, or lack of creditor interest can
change this principle or remove the fundamental impropriety which taints a settlement
which does not comply with it."); In re Taylor, 190 B.R. 413, 416 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995)
("When bringing a complaint objecting to the discharge, a creditor becomes, in effect, the
trustee of that action as it inures to all creditors.").
96. Id. at 347 (citing Loc. R. 7041-1 (Bankr. D. Minn.)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
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discharge."99

The result can be different when the discharge has been denied after
a trial on the merits. In the case of In re Speece,'l° a creditor filed an
objection to discharge alleging that the debtor concealed interests in real
and personal property with the intent to defraud creditors of the
bankruptcy estate. After a two-day trial, the bankruptcy court found in
favor of the creditor and entered an order denying the discharge. 0 ' The
debtor appealed. 0 2 While the appeal was pending, the creditor and the
debtor reached a settlement wherein the debtor would pay $3,000 and
convey his interest in certain real property to the creditor in exchange for
retention of a motor vehicle and dismissal with prejudice of the discharge
complaint. 0 3 Notice was given to all creditors and parties in interest, with
the United States Trustee filing the lone opposition to the settlement.' °4
The court refused to approve the settlement, noting that: (1) all
consideration for the settlement was to be paid to the creditor, and not to
the estate as a whole; (2) the effect of the settlement would be to allow the
debtor to buy a discharge when the court had determined, after trial, that
debtor was not entitled to a discharge; (3) the settlement would also have
the effect of barring creditors from pursuing the debtor for collection, and
thus was not in their best interests; and (4) that "[plernitting parties to
bargain to vacate the judgment denying discharge would discourage
pretrial settlements and would confer an inappropriate windfall on the
winning party in the form of an opportunity to gain a more favorable
settlement by selling off the public advantages of the judgment."0 5 The

99. In the words of the court:
Furthermore, to the extent that the Vickers and Moore cases hold that the per se
rule against settlement of § 727 cases should be extended to cases brought by the
trustee because such a settlement would constitute a 'buying of the discharge,'
this Court disagrees. A debtor cannot be guilty of 'buying the discharge' unless
he is not entitled to the discharge in the first place. In this case, the Trustee's
allegations of Debtor misconduct have not yet been tried and the Debtor's
entitlement to a discharge is as likely as it is not. Under these circumstances,
where the debtor's fraudulent misconduct has not been judicially determined, the
Court holds that approval of the proposed settlement does not constitute a
'buying of the discharge' and does not compromise the integrity of the judicial
system. Instead, the proposed settlement represents an attempt by the Trustee to
act in the best interests of the estate by limiting the estate's exposure to the risks
and expenses of trial in the face of an uncertain outcome, in light of the public
policy concerns necessarily implicated by §727 proceedings, settlements of this
type are to be viewed with skepticism and are subject to especially close scrutiny
by the bankruptcy court. Nevertheless, a per se rule against settlement in all
cases is inappropriate, as such a rule would wholly deny the benefits of
compromise in cases where settlement is in the best interests of the estate.
Id. at 347-48.
100. 159 B.R. 314 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1993).
101. Id.at322.
102. IdA at 316.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 316-17.
105. Id at 320-21 (citation omitted).
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latter comment is interesting, since it implies a willingness to consider (if
not encourage) settlement of § 727 actions prior to trial.
A case that purports to follow the principles outlined above but
reaches a markedly different result is In re Mavrode.0 6 In Mavrode, a
creditor filed a § 727 action alleging that the debtor intentionally failed to
schedule certain property.10 7 Prior to trial, a settlement was reached
whereby the debtor's son would pay the creditor $15,000 in exchange for
Notice of the
dismissal of the adversary proceeding with prejudice.10
settlement was given to all creditors, the United States Trustee and the
Chapter 7 trustee.10 9 No objection to the settlement was made.110 The
Mavrode court showed no concern with the fact that the monies at issue
would be paid to the objecting creditor."' Instead, the court found that
the settlement benefitted the entire estate because: (1) expensive and timeconsuming litigation would be rendered unnecessary; (2) the creditor
whose claim was being paid would no longer seek recovery from the
bankruptcy estate; and (3) the settlement of litigation could
result in
12
creditors.
to
distribution
for
available
being
assets
additional
The Mavrode analysis is perplexing for several reasons. First, the
litigation was brought by a creditor and not the Chapter 7 trustee. It is
therefore difficult to understand how the fees and expenses incurred in
this action would be borne by the bankruptcy estate. If fees are not borne
by the bankruptcy estate, continuation of the litigation does not operate to
the estate's detriment.' 3 Furthermore, the effect of the settlement was to

106. 205 B.R. 716 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997).
107. Id. at 719.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. I& at721.
112. Mavrode, 205 B.R.at 721.
113. Although at least one court has indicated that a creditor who successfully objects to
discharge may be entitled to recovery of fees and expenses, See In re Speece, 159 B.R. 314,
321 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1993), there does not appear to be any statutory authority for such
an award. The Speece court relied upon § 503(b)(3) and (4). § 503(b)(3) provides thatAfter notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses, other
than claims allowed under section 502() of this title, including... (3) the actual,
necessary expenses other than compensation and reimbursement specified in
paragraph (4) of this subsection, incurred by(A) a creditor that files a petition under section 303 of this title;
(B) a creditor that recovers, after the court's approval, for the benefit of the
estate any property transferred or concealed by the debtor
(C) a creditor in connection with the prosecution of a criminal offense relating
to the case or to the business or property of the debtor;
(D) a creditor, an indenture trustee, an equity security holder, or a committee
representing creditors or equity security holders other than a committee
appointed under section 1102 of this title, in making a substantial
contribution in a case under chapter 9 or 11 of this title;
(E)a custodian superceded under section 543 of this title, and compensation
for the services of such custodian; or
(F) a member of a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title, if
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preclude all creditors from taking any further action to pursue the debtor.
The opinion in Mavrode is curiously silent as to what, if any, assets were
available for distribution to creditors. If such assets existed, they were
available for distribution to creditors regardless of whether the debtor
received his discharge. It is difficult to understand how the Mavrode court
determined that the settlement was in the best interests of all creditors and
the estate. It is equally problematic to harmonize Mavrode with the
decisions set forth above.
In one of the most recent cases addressing the question, a Chapter 7
trustee objected to the debtors' discharge, alleging that the debtors'
provided false information in their bankruptcy schedules. 114 The trustee
then sought court approval of a settlement whereby the debtors would pay
$5,000 into the estate in exchange for withdrawal of the objection to
discharge." 5 All of the debtors' creditors and the United States Trustee
were notified of the proposed settlement, and no one objected." 6 The
bankruptcy court, citing both Moore and Vickers, denied the trustee's
motion on the ground that neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the
Bankruptcy Rules permit the compromise of a § 727 complaint." 7 The
bankruptcy court also found that such compromises violate public policy
and endanger the integrity of the bankruptcy system. 1 8 Finally, the
bankruptcy court pronounced its unequivocal intention to refrain from
approving settlements of § 727 claims in the future." 9
On appeal, the district court rejected the blanket ban on settlement of

such expenses are incurred in the performance of the duties of such
committee;
11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b)(3) (West 2001). § 503(b)(4) provides:
(4) reasonable compensation for professional services rendered by an attorney or
an accountant of an entity whose expense is allowable under paragraph (3) of this
subsection, based on the time, the nature, the extent and the value of such
services, and the cost of comparable services other than in a case under this title,
and reimbursement for actual necessary expenses incurred by such attorney or
accountant;
11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b)(4) (West 2001). There is nothing in these sections that discusses the
ability of a creditor pursuing a § 727 claim to recover its fees and expenses.
114. In re Maynard,269 B.R. 535 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2001).
115. Id. at 537-38.
116. Id.
117. Wolinsky v. Maynard (In re Maynard), 258 B.R. 91, 94 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2001).
118. Id. The court stated:
To allow trustees to settle objections to discharge would be to endorse an
unacceptable derogation of the integrity of the bankruptcy system and to
encourage what could be a disturbing abuse of power by trustees. Trustees
should not seek to put debtors in a position where they can defeat an adversary
proceeding filed under § 727 by paying funds to the bankruptcy estate. If the
debtor is entitled to a discharge, any demand for payment is improper and the
complaint must be dismissed; if the debtor is not entitled to a discharge, the
objection to discharge action should proceed and should not be withdrawn based
upon a payment of any sum of money from the debtor to the plaintiff.
Id.
119. Id. at 95.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss3/1

20

658

Michael and Pacewicz: Settling Objections to Discharge in Bankruptcy Cases: An Unsettli
TULSA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 37:637

Notwithstanding the failure of any party to object, the court held a
hearing at which it declined to approve the settlement. 30° As it did so, the
court ruled that the creditor had undertaken a fiduciary responsibility in
bringing the § 727 claim.13 The creditor could not rid itself of that duty by
assigning the consideration for any proposed settlement to its § 523
claim.132 The court further found that notice of the proposed settlement
was defective due to failure to disclose the proposed consideration the
creditor was to receive.' 3 3 The court also noted that in any event, should
the creditor desire to pursue the settlement further, any and all monies
under the terms of the settlement must be paid to the estate for
distribution to all creditors.1 4
It should come as no surprise that a different bankruptcy court
135
reached an entirely opposite result. In Palmerv. Hayden (In re Hayden),
the creditor brought a complaint originally sounding only in § 727. The
creditor later sought and obtained permission to amend the complaint to
include causes of action under § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6). The debtor did not
oppose the requested amendment. The parties reached an agreement
whereby the creditor would dismiss the § 727 claim in exchange for a
judgment of non-dischargeability as to its debt. Notice of the proposed
settlement was given. Only the United States Trustee objected, on the
basis that: (1) it was not served with the various pleadings filed in the
adversary proceeding; (2) the settlement was tantamount to the debtor
buying his discharge; and (3) the amendment of the complaint to include
an action under § 523 was improper, as the amendment was allowed after
the deadline for filing § 523 complaints. 3 6 Although given the opportunity
to do so, the United States Trustee declined to be substituted as a party
plaintiff in the discharge action, and filed a "Statement and
Recommendation" in which the United States Trustee
affirnatively alleged
37
that "there appears no grounds for a § 727 action."
After a hearing, the court approved the settlement. The court
specifically found that the agreement to hold the specific debt nondischargeable was not "tied to the threat of the § 727 action." 3 8 The court
further noted that the consent to the entry of a judgment of nondischargeability was not the same as offering a cash payment to the
creditor, because "admitting the non-dischargeability of the debt does not
mean that the insolvent Debtor is agreeing to or will pay anything towards

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 60.
Id. at 57.
DeArmond, 240 B.R. at 58.
Id.at 60.
Id. at 59.
246 B.RI 795 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1999).
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id. at 798.
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§ 727 claims. 1 2 ° The court first cast aside concerns about "trafficking in
discharges" by pointing out that the allegations of debtor misconduct
contained in the complaint had yet to be judicially determined. 2
The
court then addressed the public policy considerations, concluding that:
In addition to the important public interest in upholding the integrity of
the bankruptcy system and preventing tainted compromise, there is a
public interest in encouraging just, speedy, inexpensive and final
resolution of disputes. Furthermore, a determination that a § 727
objection to discharge can never be compromised could have the practical
effect of deterring plaintiffs from bringing meritorious complaints, or of
depriving defendant debtors of the full protection of the bankruptcy court's
oversight. 122
The district court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court with
instructions to determine whether the terms of the proposed compromise
were fair and equitable and in the best interests of the estate. 1 3 The
bankruptcy court was also instructed "to fashion case-appropriate terms
and conditions if necessary to protect other creditors." 124 The district
court's decision reflects a growing body of case law moving away from a per
se rule against settling objections to discharge, and toward a case-by-case
2
analysis. 5
VII. SETrLEMENT OF COMPLAINTS SOUNDING IN BOTH § 523 AND § 727
In another common scenario, a creditor will file a complaint which
objects to the granting of the debtor's discharge under § 727 and, in the
alternative, seek a finding that the debt owed to the particular creditor is
non-dischargeable under § 523. The results in those cases also vary. In
the case of In re DeArmond,c2 6 a creditor brought claims under both § 523
and § 727. The debtor and the creditor then entered into a settlement
whereby the entire action would be dismissed in exchange for a payment of
$8,000 to the creditor over a three and one-half year period. 27 The
creditor fied a motion to approve the settlement, providing notice that the
settlement would result in the dismissal of the § 727 claim but failing to
provide notice of the consideration to be paid.128 There were no objections
9
to the proposed settlement.
120. Maynard,269 B.R. at 542.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 543.
124. Id.
125. On remand, the bankruptcy court determined that the proposed settlement was not
fair and equitable and denied the trustee's motion. See Wolinksky v. Maynard (In re
Maynard), 273 B.R. 369, 373-74 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2002).
126. 240 B.R. 51 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999).
127. Id. at 54.
128. Id. at 59.
129. Id.
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the debt."139 The court further found that the facts pled in the original
complaint put the debtor on sufficient notice of the § 523 claims. 140 In
addition, the court noted that the United States Trustee declined the
opportunity to be substituted as party plaintiff, specifically stating its belief
that the § 727 complaint was without merit. Finally, the court stated its
support for "the policy that if the objecting party does not wish to be
it should not be heard to complain and the action may
substituted, then
141
be dismissed."
In a similar situation, a creditor ified an action under both § 523 and
§ 727, and then sought to settle the litigation in its entirety in exchange for
a judgment of non-dischargeabiity.' 42 The court at first refused to approve
the settlement, and then reconsidered, apparently on the basis that the §
727 complaint was without merit. 143 The opinion is silent as to what notice
of the proposed settlement was given to creditors and parties in interest.144
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAwN (IF ANY)

What are we to take from this broad spectrum of analyses,
approaches and results? In many cases, the compromises at issue were
unopposed. Notwithstanding that fact, many courts felt compelled not
only to disapprove the compromise, but to write and publish on the issue.
Bankruptcy courts are in essence trial courts-published opinions
represent a tiny fraction of their business. While the decisions reviewed
here give some insight into the approaches taken by the courts which have
chosen to publish on the issue, there may well be a much larger body of
unpublished law governing the issue of § 727 settlements.
The question raised by these cases goes to the role of the discharge in
the American bankruptcy system. It could be described as whether the
granting of a bankruptcy discharge is a matter of micro-economics (the
economics of the bankruptcy case) or macro-morality (discharges should
only be given to the "honest but unfortunate" debtor). It appears that
many courts are moving away from the view that a bankruptcy discharge
is a privilege that may never be soiled by the taint of compromise. Such a

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 799.
Id. at 800-01.
Hayden, 246 B.R. at 799 (citation omitted).
SouthTrustNatL Bank v. Parcus (In re Parcus), 269 B.R 457 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001).
The following portion of the opinion is instructive:

It appears that counsel in the case before the Court was not aware of the
consequences of joining a potentially frivolous cause of action under § 727 to
deny the debtor's entire discharge with a complaint to determine dischargeability
under § 523 of a single debt. It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and
DECREED that the settlement agreement proposed by the parties is hereby
approved with the warning that § 727 should not be used as a negotiation tactic.
Id. at 458.
144. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama does not
appear to have a local rule governing notice of such settlements.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001

23

660

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 3, Art. 1
TULSA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 37:637

view may be founded in the realism that most parties to a bankruptcy case
are driven by economic concerns instead of a sense of moral right and
wrong.
For the practitioner, the lessons to be learned can perhaps be
summed up in three general "tenets:" (1) know thy local rules; (2) know thy
judge; and (3) know the merits of thy § 727 complaint. Where the local
rules (or the judge) prohibit settlement, then one must be ready to try the §
727 complaint, and should only file those complaints which one is
prepared to try. At a minimum, the client should be aware of the potential
pitfalls, and be made aware early in the process that the spoils of any
settlement may end up in the collective hands of all of the estate's
creditors.
The cases that view the compromise of § 727 actions under the same
standards as compromises in other litigation, coupled with an appreciation
of the role the discharge plays in bankruptcy from a public policy
standpoint, have the most appeal, both intellectually and practically.
Those cases recognize the difficulty that a court faces in forcing litigation
by a reluctant plaintiff. They also recognize that the mere filing of an
objection to discharge is not tantamount to a determination that a debtor
has acted improperly. Finally, they recognize that the decision of whether
to approve a § 727 compromise, as with any other compromise, is best
considered as a fact-specific matter, to be determined on a case-by-case
basis.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss3/1

24

